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Risky Strategies? Putin’s Federal Reforms and the Accommodation of 
Difference in Russia* 
DAVID CASHABACK 
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK 
 
This article examines Vladimir Putin’s reforms to Russia’s federal system since 2000. The 
initial rationale for the reforms was the need to strengthen the capacity of the central 
government after Boris Yeltsin had engaged in a controversial practice of negotiated 
federalism, granting federal units autonomy and asymmetrical rights and powers. This 
article considers the legacy of the Yeltsin administration and shows that some aspects of 
these reforms were indeed necessary in order to enforce federal law, the constitution and 
make inter-budgetary relations more stable. Nevertheless, by focusing attention on two 
recent reforms passed in 2003 – on regional government and local self-government – the 
author argues that Putin’s vision of federalism overlooks some crucial aspects 
underpinning Russia’s federal system, namely the existence of ethno-national minorities 
and the benefits of negotiated autonomy arrangements as a way of accommodating 
minority nationalism. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Debates about the nature of Russian federalism are ongoing. In the early 1990s, the 
Russian leadership elected not to break with Soviet legacy but rather maintain the 
ethno-territorial hierarchies that had hitherto been a hallmark of Soviet federalism. As a 
consequence, a tension remains between these ethno-territorial republics and the 1993 
constitution, which equalized all of Russia’s constituent units, as well as with the 
bilateral power-sharing treaties and agreements which were subsequently concluded 
between the federal and regional governments. As Boris Yeltsin’s presidency drew to a 
close at the end of 1999, the sustainability of Russia’s system of negotiated and 
asymmetrical federalism  raised a number of fundamental questions: do such practices 
create or hinder governance capacity or is federalism a chimera in Russia? With the 
accession of Vladimir Putin to Russia’s presidency in 2000, the question of 
sustainability was tackled head-on. The autonomies which Boris Yeltsin established 
were widely considered to lead to state collapse. Consequently, the new 
administration’s priority would be to undo this legacy and restore stability to federative 
relations. 
This article examines the shifts and vicissitudes of the debate on federalization since 
2000. It considers various developments in Russian federalism, including Putin’s 
reform strategy, institutional and legal decisions and emerging legislation in an attempt 
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to identify how federalism is articulated under the current administration. Reform per 
se is nevertheless not a risky proposal. Changes were overdue to strengthen governance 
capacity; diminishing the influence of regional leaders over federal bureaucrats located 
in the regions; establishing more coherence in inter-budgetary relations, and 
sanctioning regions which flouted the constitution or federal laws. This article argues 
that it is possible to identify three axioms underlying Putin’s conception of federalism 
as articulated in his rhetoric and programme of reform, namely: the equality of citizens, 
symmetry of governments, and a rigid division of powers and competences among 
levels of authority. Arguing that federalism needs to set out a precise division of 
powers and framework of accountability, Putin’s reforms have consequently set out to 
strengthen the power vertical and give the centre the upper hand in its relations with 
federal subunits.  
Nevertheless, it is argued here that Putin’s reform programme overlooks crucial 
characteristics of Russia’s federal system. First, it neglects the interdependence which 
can and does exist in federal systems. Second, it minimizes the importance of intra-
governmental representation of regional interests within the institutions of the federal 
government. Third, and arguably most significantly, it overlooks the initial conditions 
which led Yeltsin to practise negotiated federalism. At the outset, negotiated federalism 
was a means to recognize ethno-national difference and quell a constitutional crisis of 
legitimacy. Since 2000, the federal government has articulated centre-regional relations 
as a question of jurisdiction instead of recognition, thus overlooking the fact that there 
remains a degree of disagreement about the nature of the constitutional bargain in 
Russia, and that autonomy arrangements provided the leadership with a degree of 
flexibility to facilitate the management of these disagreements. Putin’s reforms may 
well indicate that federative relations have evolved, and that these forms of autonomy, 
and the flexibility they afford, are no longer required. However, in Tatarstan, Chechnya 
and other republics, evidence suggests that the centre’s initiatives to rollback 
negotiated federalism and reassert a power vertical are examples of continuing 
divergences about the nature of the Russian state. 
The article begins with an overview of the practice of federalism under Yeltsin, and 
an examination of the autonomy arrangements which were the hallmarks of his 
presidency. It then considers the rhetoric of change under Putin, as articulated against 
the backdrop of federal practice in the 1990s, and how this rhetoric is turned into 
concrete reform initiatives, building on existing analyses of the reforms undertaken in 
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2000. It considers two recent reform initiatives in more detail: a law on the 
organization of regional government, and one on local self-government, both of which 
emerged from the work of a Presidential Commission on the division of powers. It is 
argued throughout that Vladimir Putin’s reforms can be analysed as yielding a specific 
model of federalism and of federal-regional relations. The final section subsequently 
considers to what extent this model of federalism and its break with the practice 
prevalent during the 1990s constitutes a new way of managing diversity and autonomy 
in the Russian Federation, and whether it should be analysed as a risky strategy.  
 
II. The Yeltsin Years and Federal Fragmentation  
 
Looking back to the early 1990s, it can be seen that there was a lack of agreement on 
the form and content of the Russian state. An important facet of these debates was the 
question whether post-Soviet Russia should keep or abandon ethno-federalism as a 
principle of territorial organization (Jackson and Lynn 2002; Lynn and Novikov 1997). 
In the various political struggles of the time, the status quo prevailed and was 
consolidated with the signing of the Federal Treaty in 1992 (Strashun 1996). This was 
the first of several attempts by the federal centre to codify how power was to be shared 
between Moscow and the constituent units, and maintained a differentiation in the 
status between republics and other constituent units. Yet it did not put a stop to 
federation-building.  
In the various constitutional negotiations during 1993, the question of the republics’ 
ultimate status, and the place the Federal Treaty should occupy in the new constitution 
were constant obstacles. The leaders of Russia’s republics objected to the president’s 
draft as it challenged the notion that republics were sovereign states. The competing 
draft constitution of the Supreme Soviet instead sought to do away with differentiated 
status for ethno-territorial units. The debate quickly polarized between those in favour 
of a more ‘unitary’ state structure and those advancing a confederal arrangement. For 
their part, Russia’s (non-ethnic) regions objected to second-rate status and unilaterally 
claimed republic status (the creation of a Ural Republic by Sverdlovsk governor 
Eduard Rossel being the most prominent example of this). With the crushing defeat of 
his parliamentary foes and suspension of the Constitutional Court, Yeltsin could 
finalize his constitution-making from a position of strength. The result was a 
constitution which represented a significant shift in the architecture of Russia’s federal 
  4 
institutions, inter alia by equalizing all subjects of the federation (Art. 5). The basic 
law was, however, not approved by the population in seven republics, most notably in 
Chechnya where no referendum was held, and Tatarstan where the turnout was too 
low.  
To quell the constitutional legitimacy crisis, the federal government engaged in 
bilateral negotiations with the recalcitrant entities. The first bilateral treaty was signed 
with Tatarstan in February 1994, granting it significant autonomy in the fields of 
economic development and culture (Guboglo 1997: 416-38). While treaties with other 
republics such as Bashkortostan and Sakha followed, efforts to reach one with 
Chechnya did not avert bloodshed. In his Annual Address in 1995, Yeltsin spoke of the 
decision to sign such agreements in a positive light, pointing out that these treaties 
helped regulate the centre’s relations with subjects of the federation. The problem of 
sovereignty in Russia, he continued, was strongly linked to its federalization, which 
would be the surest way to maintain the territorial integrity of the state (Yeltsin 1995). 
Although this practice of “emergency political first aid” (Yeltsin 1997) was 
subsequently extended to close to fifty federal subjects, the initial treaties reached with 
the republics provided greater autonomy than the latter treaties, which tended to be 
more cosmetic, only reaffirming the existing constitutional division of powers (Hughes 
2001b; Ivanov 1997: 49-50). 
Asymmetry in Russia’s arrangements with its constituent units is the hallmark of 
Yeltsin’s practice of federalism, where autonomy was granted in response to 
disagreements on the nature of Russia’s federal system. Some analysts (Hughes 2001b; 
Smith 1998) have consequently pointed to the benefits of negotiated federalism, 
showing how it fostered governance mechanisms and patterns of federal-regional 
interaction to minimize secessionist pressures – Tatarstan being the most prominent 
example here. However, this has not been the standard interpretation. In many 
republics and regions, the consequence of devolution has been an increase in legal and 
legislative dissonance, unimplemented court judgements, and the growth of severe 
inequalities. It is in this sense that much of the academic and political commentary 
tends to underline the dangers of Yeltsin’s asymmetrical federalism: it weakens 
Bundestreue (Kahn 2002), creates a “dangerous precedent” (Stoner-Weiss 1997) which 
fails to promote respect for the central government (Sergei Valentei quoted in Smith 
1998: 1398), circumvents Russia’s constitution, weakens institutions and democracy 
(Sakwa 2002), and thus fragments the legal space in Russia. The arguments against 
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Yeltsin’s autonomy arrangements tend not to engage with the basic principles behind 
the institutional choices, but against what has emerged in practice, that is, what leaders 
did with their autonomy.  
 
III. Putin and the Rationale for Reform 
 
Putin has shown a keen awareness of the abuses of power that resulted from negotiated 
federalism. For Kahn, “Putin’s reforms were, more than anything else, a reaction to 
Yeltsin’s federal legacy of weak institutions and lack of consensus on basic questions 
of sovereignty and inter-governmental relations in a federal state” (Kahn 2002: 277). 
This interpretation is emblematic of much of the analysis of Putin’s federal reforms: 
upon acquiring power in 2000, he set out to re-establish a ‘balance’ in the federal 
system, restore a power vertical, thus rolling back the asymmetry which had come to 
characterize the system and attempting to redefine the basis of federal-regional 
relations. 
Vladimir Putin’s annual addresses to the Federal Assembly provide a good road-
map to the political leadership’s intentions. The first address, given in July 2000, 
unveiled the strategic direction and objectives of the reform programme. (The now 
famous formula, ‘dictatorship of the law’, was first used in this speech.) Putin voiced 
much concern on the question of the effectiveness of the state: indecision and weakness 
of state structures reduced policy and governance capacity. Regional autonomy was 
seen to have taken the upper hand: a situation where “centrifugal forces had gained 
such momentum that they were threatening [to destroy] the state itself” (in Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, cited hereinafter as RFE/RL 2002b). The time had come to 
bridge the various regional “islets of power” and reassert central power (Putin 2000). 
The reforms which would be introduced that year – analysed below – sought to 
strengthen the power vertical and staunch the flow of power toward the regions. 
The 2001 Address announced the creation of a commission headed by Presidential 
Administration Deputy Head Dmitrii Kozak to examine the division of powers between 
the levels of government and establish a more clear-cut division of competences and 
powers, to be set by federal law, “to precisely determine where the powers of the 
federal bodies should be and where the powers of the subjects of the Federation [should 
be].” Similarly, Putin introduced changes to Russia’s system of inter-budgetary 
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relations, an indication of the political interest in rationalizing Russia’s system of fiscal 
federalism: “The clear-cut distribution of resources and tax payments is a matter of the 
responsibility and effective implementation of mutual obligations by various levels of 
government” (Putin 2001). The emphasis here is on the creation of mechanisms to 
promote control and accountability of policy and funding commitments. 
In the president’s 2002 Address, stable inter-budgetary relations and delineation of 
policy responsibilities were again significant themes. Importantly, this speech touched 
directly on the treaty process. Although he describes the process as having been 
legitimate and having responded to the political exigencies of the early 1990s, Putin 
concludes that the practice of these agreements led to an inequality in relations between 
the constituent parts of the federation, thus by extension, between the citizens of 
various territories. As a result, 28 of 42 treaties were annulled. Moreover, Putin objects 
to the way in which bilateral treaty-making was practised under Yeltsin: “behind the 
backs of constituent units of the Federation” and “without any preliminary discussion 
and the securing of a public consensus” (Putin 2002). Although Putin does not 
necessarily condemn the practice per se, saying they may have been necessary to take 
regional specificities into account, he is not faced with the same political pressures as 
Yeltsin: in 2002, the problem is not so much containing nationalism or separatism, but 
enforcing the division of powers. The argument at this point is consequently more 
about enhancing state capacity and re-establishing a power vertical than preserving the 
autonomy of federal subjects.  
 
IV. Implementation of Federal Reforms 
 
Discussions about the need for reform to strengthen state capacity and reassert the 
authority of the constitution had been ongoing since 1996, when Putin was appointed 
head of the Main Control Department, and was charged with overseeing the 
relationships between the centre and regions (Smirnyagin 2001). At the time, proposals 
were made to change the composition of the Federation Council, inter-budgetary 
relations and the delineation of competences. Audits of regional finances subsequently 
became Putin’s preferred tool to expose regional abuse of funds and promote increased 
accountability. In addition, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree to regulate the treaty process 
in 1996 (No. 370, Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii: n.12 at 1058) and 
in 1999 a law on the division of competences between bodies of state power was 
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enacted (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva: n.42 at 5005) to reaffirm the supremacy of federal 
law and the inviolability of articles 71 and 72 of the federal constitution (on the 
division of powers between federal and regional levels). Whereas under Yeltsin these 
efforts to change the federal system remained either under-implemented or ignored, 
Putin followed up on his promises for change and implemented concrete reforms from 
the very start of his term.  
 
Federal Districts and Presidential Representatives 
Putin’s opening salvo for reform came in the form of a decree restructuring the 
presidential administration (Decree 849, Sobranie zakonodatel’stva: n.20 at 2112, 
2000). It abolished the post of presidential representative in each of the federation’s 
subjects and reorganized the federation into seven umbrella administrative regions, 
following the boundaries of existing military districts, headed by an appointed 
plenipotentiary representative subordinate to the president.1 For Putin, the territorial 
aggregation of this monitoring function was not a federal or constitutional but 
“managerial reform”, and as such, proceeding by decree rather than through 
constitutional change was considered legitimate and appropriate (in RFE/RL 2002c). 
The decree set out three tasks: to monitor the regions’ conformity to federal law and 
the constitution; to coordinate the activities of federal-level officials in the regions; and 
to analyse and report on the effectiveness of local law enforcement agencies. In 
essence, this reform programme sought to implement the ‘dictatorship of the law’, 
providing the centre with more effective monitoring capacity than Yeltsin’s 
representatives had provided with the aim of ensuring the creation of a unified legal 
space. A subsequent decree subordinated the presidential representatives to the head of 
the Presidential Administration (Decree 97, Sobranie zakonodatel’stva: n.6 at 551, 
2001). 
Assessments of this reform are mixed. The consolidation of the centre’s monitoring 
ability was supposed to make the institution of the presidential representative more 
effective. The system under Yeltsin had been seen as unwieldy because of the large 
number of representatives and their lack of resources – practically each federation 
subject had its envoy, who often depended on the regional government for resources. 
                                               
1 The institution of presidential representative was not new to Putin. Indeed, Yeltsin appointed a 
representative to each of the federation subjects to monitor and report back to the centre as early as 1991. 
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Putin’s change sought to remove the influence of regional leaders on the activities of 
the representatives, but also on the activities of federal officials and ministries. 
Commentators have pointed to the transitory nature of the representative (a “crisis 
institution”), which has no clearly stated responsibilities, political power base, and little 
public support (Lysenko 2002; Perovic 2002; Ryklin 2002). In April 2003, the 
president verbally expanded the powers of his seven envoys, charging them to monitor 
the implementation of the federal electoral law, land reform, and significantly, granted 
them a greater deal of oversight of federal transfers to the regions (Ofitova 2003). But 
no decree or order has yet officialized these new responsibilities (RFE/RL 2003b). The 
scope of the so-called ‘managerial reform’ seems to be increasing. 
Because of the military background of most of the envoys, fears had been voiced 
about risks of militarization of the presidential districts (Isakova 2001) or of 
presidential representatives gaining control over regional budgets. But in reality the 
assessment of the work of the presidential representatives has varied. Effectiveness has 
rested on each envoy’s personality and particular interests (EWI 2002c; Mikheev 
2002). The heads of Russia’s more powerful regions still take their concerns directly to 
the president. Moreover, the institution, which was created purportedly to promote a 
unified legal space and more accountability, is itself relatively insulated from the 
public. Representatives’ reports go directly to the president and the head of the 
Presidential Administration. It is impossible to demand a report of their activities and 
according to Sergei Kocherov, “it is difficult to judge how profitable their work is for 
the region, for example, in terms of attracting investment or support for small or 
medium-sized businesses, because we do not see any kind of practical results of their 
activities” (in RFE/RL 2002d). 
  
Changes to the Federation Council 
Soon after this first reform, a law was enacted in July 2000 to modify the composition 
of the Federation Council (FC) (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva: n.32 at 3336). Since 1995, 
leaders of the legislative and executive branches of the subjects had been appointed ex 
officio. Putin, continuing his crackdown on regional abuses of funds, sought to remove 
the rights of regional leaders to sit in the upper chamber, and by the same token from 
the levers of power and influence in Moscow. The law directs the legislative and 
executive branches of regional government to each select a representative. 
Commentators have remarked that the ex officio system produced a relatively 
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compliant upper chamber at the time when regional leaders were presidential 
appointees, but that this compliance could not be taken for granted once elections for 
regional heads were introduced in 1996 (Hyde 2001). Furthermore, as it was composed 
of regional leaders that met only a few days a month, the FC was not necessarily the 
most effective law-making body. Nevertheless, despite fears that filling the chamber 
with full-time professional legislators might create a more unruly forum, this was a risk 
Putin announced he was ready to take. 
The measure was strongly opposed by regional leaders and was vetoed by the FC 
before being sent to a conciliation commission. Some changes from the initial 
legislative draft were approved, in part to mollify the opposition of regional leaders. 
Notably, governors obtained the right to keep their seats until their own terms expired. 
Furthermore, the term of incoming FC representatives was to be the same as that of the 
body which appointed them (Huskey 2001; Hyde 2001). In addition, Putin created a 
new institution, the State Council, where the leaders of all 89 subjects meet on a 
quarterly basis, and a presidium composed of the president and seven regional leaders, 
one per district, appointed for a six-month term (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva: n.36 at 
3633, 2000). Although the body is consultative, its aim is to promote the participation 
of regional leaders in the “preparation and passing of important national decisions” 
(Putin 2000). 
Even though the effectiveness of the reformed FC has been questioned, there is little 
evidence that a professional chamber has been more obstructive. Putin’s legislative 
output does not seem to have suffered. A number of regional leaders objected to losing 
their role at the federal level. Like many regional leaders, Chuvash President Nikolai 
Fedorov believed they would “be deprived of the capability to influence and have any 
effect on this policy in the country’s constitutional bodies” (Tropkina 2000), thus 
losing a valuable outlet for the airing of regional grievances at the centre. In any event, 
the way in which posts on the Federation Council have been filled calls into question 
whether leaders see the body as a place where regional interests can be aggregated and 
represented at the centre: as Gel’man points out, about 35 per cent of the members of 
the FC have no connection to the region they represent, and are either Muscovites 
and/or representatives of big business (EWI 2002c; Gel'man 2002).  
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Federal Intervention 
Putin’s reforms in the area of federal intervention (powers of disallowance and 
reservation) sought to combat the problem of ‘separatism in the legal sphere’. By 2000, 
the Prosecutor General reported that 70 per cent of regional legislative acts deviated 
from federal legislation, and 34 per cent contradicted the federal constitution (Hyde 
2001). According to the Russian Ministry of Justice, 18 of 21 republican constitutions, 
and a third of 16,000 laws it examined contradicted federal law (Hughes 2001b:65n20; 
Kahn 2002). The separatism in the legal sphere was seen to emanate from the practice 
of treaty-based federalism in the 1990s. But bilateral treaties alone cannot be blamed 
for the full extent of separatism in the legal sphere. First, many of the laws that were in 
violation were declaratory and had little real effect on the workings of the system 
(Orttung and Reddaway 2003). Second, legal dissonance is a function of the complex 
system of shared jurisdiction (Article 76 §4 of the Russian Constitution). In areas of 
joint jurisdiction, if no federal law is in place, there can be 89 different approaches to 
an area of law. Regions had the ability to gain regulatory competence at the expense of 
the federal level, thus shifting the balance of power in their favour (Hønneland and 
Blakkisrud 2001: 42). As the Russian parliament started to enact legislation in areas of 
joint jurisdiction, dissonance was bound to result. 
The right to federal intervention is based on several articles of the 1993 Constitution 
which designate the president guarantor of the federal Constitution (Art. 80 §2), grant 
him the right to suspend legislative acts which contradict federal law or the constitution 
(Art. 85 §2), and establish that in areas of federal and shared jurisdiction, the bodies of 
executive power of the federal government and of the subjects of the federation consist 
of a unified system of executive power (Art. 77 §2) (Kahn 2002). The Putin 
administration amended the 1999 law on the organization of legislative and executive 
bodies of state power (cited above) to grant the president the right to dismiss regional 
leaders or regional parliaments that violate federal law. Although the president has 
made use of the powers of disallowance, suspending treaties and other normative acts 
which contradict federal legislation, the power to fire regional leaders has so far gone 
untested as the courts have added some extra hurdles to the procedure: courts of three 
jurisdictions, including the Constitutional Court, must concur in the decision to 
suspend a regional leader or legislature.  
A decision of the Constitutional Court in July 2003 further constrained the powers 
of interference. In a case brought by the republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan 
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challenging the Prosecutor General’s right to challenge the constitutionality of regional 
constitutions or charters, the court found that even if a regional constitution violated 
federal law, it was not sufficient grounds to declare that document unconstitutional and 
invalid. Regional constitutions and charters, contrary to laws or normative acts of the 
subjects of the federation, have a particular relationship with the constitution of the 
Russian Federation and consequently cannot be considered ‘ordinary’ legal acts. 
Whereas before the prosecutor could ask an administrative or civil court to ascertain 
the constitutionality of a regional constitution, the Constitutional Court ruled that only 
it can make such an assessment (Konstitutsionnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2003). 
Kahn has pointed to the problems in Putin’s approach to interference and 
disallowance, showing that it weakens the difference between federal and regional 
government. The president becomes an arbiter between branches of government. For 
Kahn, “while the Federal President possessed the power to suspend regional executive 
acts deemed by him to conflict with the federal Constitution prior to any judicial 
determination of that fact, regional elites did not possess a parallel power to suspend 
federal acts deemed by them to be in conflict with the federal constitution.” The law, 
which Kahn argues should be the main vector of conflict regulation and management in 
a federation, becomes a “weapon rather than an administrative tool” (Kahn 2002: 249, 
emphasis in original). Federal theory holds courts and judicial adjudication to be key 
institutions within federal systems. Although we must keep in mind that legal 
judgement is by its very nature political, the product of the society and politics in 
which it occurs (Dworkin 1986), the development of judicial review in Russia’s federal 
system can be a positive development. In this case, judicial adjudication has added 
procedural checks on the powers of the executive to interfere in regional affairs. If the 
courts do not become overly politicized, and parties agree to abide by the judgements 
(which has been the main challenge in Russia so far), judicial review as an institution 
gains importance, not because it stymies the centre’s power vertical or regional 
autonomy, but because it constrains centre and region in a common procedure to 
mediate tension over the interpretation and meaning of constitutions and law.  
 
Kozak Reforms 
Building on the three reforms examined above, following his 2001 Annual Address, 
Putin appointed a Presidential Commission for the Demarcation of Powers between the 
Federal, Regional and Municipal Levels of Government, naming a former colleague 
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from the administration of St Petersburg mayor Anatolii Sobchak and Dmitrii Kozak, 
deputy head of the Presidential Administration, to direct its work. This Commission 
would suggest fundamental changes to the system of federative relations in Russia, 
examining and recommending the annulment of power-sharing treaties and areas where 
the constitutional division of powers should be strengthened. The Commission’s report, 
Concept of Federal Reforms (cited hereinafter as Komissiya), was presented to regional 
leaders in the State Council in Spring 2002, but was reworked in response to their 
criticism (Tsvetkova and Shishkounova 2002). The Concept proposed a mechanism to 
determine a division of powers between the federal, regional and municipal orders of 
government and is explicit on the need to determine jurisdictional and funding 
responsibilities. In areas of joint jurisdiction, the Concept suggests that the federal 
government assume policy-making responsibilities, leaving regional governments to 
implement (and in some cases wholly fund) policy (Komissiya 2002). Two laws have 
emerged from Kozak’s Commission: on regional government passed in July 2003, and 
on local self-government passed in September 2003. 
 
Law on Regional Government 
The Amendments to the Federal Law on General Principles of the Organization of 
Legislative and Executive Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian 
Federation proposes a clear delimitation of federal-regional competencies, and 
circumscribes the use of treaties.2 If implemented to the full extent, it promises to be a 
watershed, especially if the presidential administration and federal government are 
steadfast in their commitment to eliminate existing bilateral treaties. According to 
Sergei Samoilov, legal aide to the president, those treaties still in force “would not 
survive much longer” (RFE/RL 2002a). Following Kozak’s concept, “constitutional 
powers should be transformed into specific powers of specific power structures on 
specific levels only on the basis of federal legislation”, thus rendering moot the practice 
of negotiated federalism (Gorodetskaya 2002). 
Whereas issues of jurisdiction and accountability were left unanswered in Putin’s 
previous reform initiatives, this particular law seeks to re-establish a balance of 
interests and powers between orders of government, resolve remaining ambiguities and 
eliminate unfunded mandates. In a nutshell, the law seeks to determine ‘Kto, za chto i 
                                               
2 The law adopted on 4 July 2003, consists of amendments to the 1999 law of the same name (Sobranie 
zakonodatel’stva: n.42 at 5005). 
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kak otvechaet v gosudarstve’ (who answers for what and how in the state) 
(Kirpichnikov and Bargandzhiya 2001). Ambiguities about each level’s responsibilities 
and commitments must be resolved so that “power”, according to Kozak, “becomes 
accountable to its citizens”, who will be in a better position to assess how much tax is 
paid to whom, for what level of service, and whom to hold accountable for successes or 
failures (quoted in Tsvetkova 2003). 
Article 3 §1 of the law reasserts the supremacy of federal law and of the federal 
constitution. If a federal law is enacted in an area of joint jurisdiction, regional 
legislation must be brought into line with the former within three months. The most 
significant modifications are made in a revamped Part IV. Article 263 §2 enumerates a 
number of shared jurisdictions for which funding must come from regional budgets 
(included in this category is a requirement to organize the provision of education 
(§2.13) and healthcare (§2.21)). Interestingly, the law provides for procedures by 
which disputes may be addressed: Article 264 §3 declares that upon objection by at 
least one third of the subjects of a federal law in an area of shared jurisdiction 
(enumerated in the Article examined above, 263), the State Duma can create a 
conciliation commission. Furthermore, §4 of the same article creates an obligation for 
the federal government to send legislation on these matters to regional bodies of 
executive and legislative power for consideration. At the same time the law extends the 
power vertical, granting the federal government power to assume temporary financial 
administration of a regional government’s competence if its budget deficit rises above 
30 per cent (Art. 269 §1(b) and §3). Upon petition by the central government to an 
arbitrage court, it can assume financial control for up to a year. 
Significant is Article 267, which enumerates the principles and methods of 
concluding treaties with federation subjects. The principle of a bilateral treaty with a 
federation subject is affirmed, but very circumscribed in section 1, following which 
treaties may be signed with only subjects possessing “economic, geographic or other 
peculiarities.” The Kozak Commission’s Concept failed to mention ethnic particularity 
as a motive too. Ethnicity had been a motive included in the law enacted in 1999 on the 
division of powers between federal and regional governments, which is superseded by 
the 2003 law on regional government.3 Ethnicity, included in the previous version, is 
                                               
3 Article 14 §2: a “Treaty can specify objects of joint jurisdiction taking into consideration political, 
social, geographical, ethnic and other particularities of subjects of the Russian Federation.” Federal’nyi 
zakon o printsipakh i poryadke razgranicheniya predmetov vedeniya i polnomochii mezhdu organami 
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therefore downgraded in the latest law, which is now the authoritative legislative guide 
to treaty and agreement-making. 
Additional requirements regarding the transparency of the process have been added: 
section 5 gives other subjects of the federation the right to consult the text of the 
proposed treaty or agreement and make comments or suggestions. The law requires 
that the proposed treaty or agreement, once established, does not violate existing law 
(§3), be approved by the executive and legislative bodies of the subject (§4), be 
submitted by the president of the federation to the federal Duma (§8). Once passed, the 
treaty has the weight of a federal law (§9), and is valid for ten years (§10). Article 310 
§5 establishes a time frame for all existing bilateral treaties must be brought into 
compliance with the law within two years.  
 
Law on Local Self-Government  
Whereas the law on bodies of power establishes a clearer delimitation of powers 
between federal and regional levels of government, the law On General Principles of 
Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation, enacted on 6 October 2003, 
promotes the economic and political capabilities of municipal government. Since 
existing legislation (enacted in 1995) is seen as being ambiguous on the status of 
municipal government, this law integrates the municipal level into the hierarchy of 
bodies of state power even though the constitution formally defines it as being separate 
from federal or regional levels (RFE/RL 2003c). For Kozak, “In principle the subjects 
of the Federation and local self-government, in their legal nature and in their status, 
occupy the same position in their relationship with the federal centre” (Tsvetkova 
2003). As with the law discussed previously, the reforms to local self-government seek 
to reinforce judicial control rather than political control of the municipal government’s 
responsibilities and funds. These proposals were not uncontroversial, as the law 
received resistance both in the Duma and in its committees: the Duma Committee on 
Local Self-Government considered over 6,000 amendments (Malyakin 2003; Melikova 
2003). 
The law proposes a new institutional framework: municipalities (cities or 
settlements with a population greater than one hundred persons) and municipal regions. 
                                                                                                                                        
gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva: n.26 at 3176, 1999, emphasis added).  
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The head of a municipality is an elected official, whereas the mayor of a municipal 
region is appointed by contract with the region’s representative body. The document 
proceeds to give a detailed breakdown of the competences of each respective level 
(Part III). The objective is to augment the effectiveness of local government and its 
governance capacity by aggregating service provision such as health care or education 
on a regional level. Each level of government is to have clearly defined responsibilities 
and powers. Since an objective of this reform is to eliminate the problem of unfunded 
mandates, responsibilities cannot be shifted to a subordinate level without an 
accompanying budgetary envelope (EWI 2002a).4 In this case, higher-level 
governments set policy, while implementation is carried out by lower-level bodies. 
Furthermore, when a government transfers funds (for instance, from federal to regional, 
or regional to municipal) for the implementation of a given policy, the donor can 
monitor the use of funds. Leaders who misuse funds could be temporarily suspended 
from power. 
Municipal-level aggregation of policy-making and delivery capacity is an interesting 
proposal in the law on local government. But its very verticality brings difficulties with 
it. Municipalities are not left to decide whether and how to aggregate functions, and 
whether to delegate functions to higher levels of government. It remains to be seen 
whether the approach adopted by the federal government (a top-down division of 
competences and funding responsibilities) is a more workable solution than enacting 
perhaps looser enabling legislation which affords regions or local level bodies more 
latitude in determining the level and form of aggregation. The creation of two separate 
administration and new bureaucratic structures at the local level creates the possibility 
of policy overlap, and by extension additional implementation challenges. 
 
It is premature to offer an exhaustive assessment of these initiatives, as it remains to be 
seen how they will be implemented. Nevertheless, taken as a statement of the centre’s 
intentions, the Kozak reforms go further than Putin’s previous efforts: the federative 
reforms of 2000 focused on containing crises and reasserting the power vertical. 
Kozak’s reforms furthermore seek to give content to this vertical by establishing a 
framework for devising and implementing policy. The changes proposed seek to 
                                               
4 Duma Budget Committee Deputy Chairman Mikhail Zadornov puts the total of unfunded mandates at 
300-350 billion rubles, while Labour Minister Aleksandr Pochinok’s figure is closer to several trillion 
rubles a year. 
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alleviate the ambiguities which increasingly characterized the division of powers. The 
implementation of the reforms promises to be complicated: some sections of both the 
laws on regional governments and local self-government will not be implemented 
before 2006, and are conditional on enacting required changes to an estimated 240 
laws, as well as to the tax and budget codes (RFE/RL 2003c). In fact, for the system to 
work effectively, it requires the existence of a functioning system of inter-budgetary 
relations and fiscal federalism. According to Dement’ev, one problem is that the central 
government views the issue of inter-budgetary relations as one that rests with other 
levels of government. The problem of budget insufficiencies is not seen to exist at the 
federal level: “all subjects of the federation have equal opportunities to formulate their 
budgets and equal tax potential” (Dement'ev 2002). But it is unclear what to do with 
the fact that there are only 18 donor regions in the country and that much of the 
revenue received by regions comes from transfers. Although the possibility of regional 
mergers is one solution which has been suggested to attenuate regional fiscal gaps, this 
fiscal imbalance is likely to be more crippling than a lack of clear division of 
competences. Moreover, recent changes to the tax code have seen the federal 
government’s share of tax revenue rise, while regions are left with sources of funding 
which are far less secure (EWI 2002b).5  
 
V. Risky Strategies? Assessment of Putin’s Reforms 
 
The Idiom of Putin’s Federalism 
In the campaign leading to his election in March 2000, Putin was portrayed as resolute, 
a man of action, in stark contrast to the sickly Boris Yeltsin of the late 1990s. In the 
reforms carried out by Putin, here too the contrast is striking. Yeltsin’s efforts to 
constrain regional leaders and manage the treaty-making process were under-
implemented or plainly ignored. In response, Vladimir Putin engaged in a course of 
reform to reassert the authority of the constitution and federal law – the power vertical 
– and reign in regional governments. The context in which these changes occurred 
provides clues for understanding their underlying rationale. Coppieters (2001: 1-9) 
suggests that analysis of a  “political idiom” (in this case, the manner of thinking and 
                                               
5 An example from the  Leningrad Oblast’: the federal government abolished the road tax, which went 
into regional coffers in exchange for an additional 1.5 per cent of the profit tax. In terms of net revenue, 
the oblast’ is a net loser. Moreover, inflationary trends in costs to enterprises (gas, taxes, customs fees, 
etc.) reduce companies’ profits thus further constraining regional budgets. 
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speaking about federalism) gives insight into the rationale for and interests behind a 
particular course of action. The remainder of the paper is devoted to identifying and 
analysing the political idiom of Putin’s federalism, based on the analysis of rhetoric 
and political action undertaken above. The objective is to elicit more precisely the 
conceptions which underlie the reform initiatives, and in so doing, attempt to identify 
some of the risks and benefits, inherent in these changes. The political idiom of 
federalism under Putin is summed up in three axioms. 
First, federalism is about guaranteeing the equality and rights of citizens. For Putin, 
the reform of the division of powers “is not simply a question of delimitation, but the 
resolution of problems which affect citizens’ rights in the social and economic spheres” 
(Glikin 2002). Negotiated federalism led to a situation whereby asymmetric policy 
capacity created differentiated rights and inequality between citizens. The Kozak 
reforms, by creating a rigorous division of powers and setting funding obligations, 
create a strong state able to work to protect the rights of citizens, irrespective of their 
region. 
Second, federalism is about symmetry in the federal government’s relations with the 
subjects of the federation, and between the subjects themselves. Symmetry is 
juxtaposed to the practice of negotiated federalism under Yeltsin and resulting 
asymmetries, and signifies equality between the federation subjects and a uniform 
power vertical between the centre and the regions. Under this heading, power-sharing 
agreements are to be re-examined because of the dissonance such practices engender: 
for Putin, the system only “aggravates the problem of inequality of the federation 
subjects in terms of their attitude toward the federal centre and toward each other” 
(quoted in RFE/RL 2001a). Federation subjects should be differentiated only on an 
exceptional basis. 
Third, federal effectiveness and policy capacity result from a clear division of power 
and competences. Since federalism, following the previous axioms, is about equality 
and symmetry between federation subjects, jurisdiction is determined through law. As 
Putin has said: “I want to emphasise and I think many would agree that we have 
dragged out the creation of a balanced and effective system, where each level of power 
knows exactly and to what degree it is responsible” (RFE/RL 2001a). The Kozak 
reforms flow from this conception and are a first effort at eliminating political 
negotiation as a means of federal-regional regulation to give precedence to law as a 
distributor of power and competence. Indeed, it is a manifestation of a new tendency in 
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federal-regional relations in Russia to, “write everything down to the smallest detail”, 
as Duma Deputy Vladimir Lysenko writes (quoted in Ryklin 2002). 
As mentioned above, the purpose of reform was to consecrate a break with the way 
federal-regional relations were practiced under Yeltsin. To a certain extent, the centre 
was successful in its struggle to establish a power vertical and fight separatism in the 
legal sphere. Only a year after Putin’s accession, Dmitrii Kozak reported that 80 per 
cent of regional laws checked by the government had been brought into compliance 
with federal law or were before the courts (RFE/RL 2001b). There has been a steady 
upward trend in the share of the federal government in tax revenue.6 Even Tatarstan, 
which was the toughest nut in terms of inter-budgetary relations, eventually relented 
(Ovrutskii 2002).7 Since Putin came to power, all but 14 bilateral treaties have been 
cancelled (Putin 2002). Markov (Markov 2001) concludes that these changes reflect a 
shift in priorities: secession, a main concern in the early 1990s addressed by Yeltsin 
with grants of sovereignty and autonomy to federal units, has now taken a back seat to 
the problem of state capacity. The vector of federal-regional relations becomes one of 
inter-budgetary relations, requiring not autonomy but rather a clear and unambiguous 
division of powers between governments. 
Putin’s idiom therefore seems to be based on a vision of federalism which gives 
precedence to the independence of governments (control, accountability, division of 
powers), plays down the need to represent regional governments (regional envoys, 
severe restriction of bilateral treaty process) and is averse to recognizing difference 
(asymmetry). Can the reform programme, based in part on this idiom, therefore be 
characterized as risky? In part, the reforms have accomplished what they set out to do: 
control regional abuses of power and funds, establish a power vertical and legal 
coherence. Where it is argued that the reforms, and Putin’s conception of federalism, 
contain risks is in their misapprehension of certain elements of federal government. 
Putin’s idiom of federalism privileges a formal, legalistic interpretation of federalism, 
which minimizes the role of inter- and intra-governmental mediation, negotiation, and 
politics as vectors of federal-regional relations. In this interpretation, the necessity of 
                                               
6 In 2000, revenue distribution between federal and regional governments was 50:50; in 2001, 56:44; and 
in 2002 it was expected to be 62:38. EWI. (2002c). Russian Regional Report. 7:20, 17 June 2002. 
7 In 2000, an agreement was reached between the federal government and the government of Tatarstan 
whereby Tatarstan would remit taxes to the Federal Treasury, but these funds would be earmarked for 
federal spending projects within the Republic. The differences are startling. Whereas in 2000 only 15 per 
cent of taxes collected in Tatarstan were forwarded to the federal treasury, by 2001 this number had 
reached 32 per cent and 49.3 per cent in 2002. 
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independence of governments in a federal system is overemphasized, and it overlooks 
the fact that intra-governmental representation can play an important integrative role. 
Most risky, in our opinion, is the change in Putin’s idiom of federalism on the question 
of recognition of ethno-national difference.  
 
Risky Strategies? 
On the question of representation, McRoberts (1993) sees federal systems as featuring 
intra-governmental arrangements that seek to promote the representation of regions 
within institutions of the federal government. Interests, therefore, are safeguarded not 
only through control of separate governments and a strict division of powers but 
through their processes of intra-governmental representation (Smiley 1971). Thus, 
communication in a federal state flows between centre and the regions, and between 
regions. The implementation of the power vertical under Putin has tended to erect 
barriers to such communication. Federal districts and presidential representatives are a 
buffer between centre and region. Subordinated to the Presidential Administration, the 
president’s envoys were not mandated to engage in federal-regional diplomacy or 
interest mediation, but only the implementation of the centre’s policies. 
Regional leaders objected to their removal from the upper chamber because it would 
prevent their participation in politics at the centre. In itself, the reform is therefore not 
problematic. Filling the chamber with professional legislators may increase its 
efficiency as a forum for intra-governmental representation or interest aggregation,  but 
the fact that many of the council’s members are Moscow-based, economic elites calls 
this into doubt. Moreover, the creation of the State Council may provide the 
opportunity for regional leaders to influence Moscow: Kozak’s Concept was severely 
criticized when it was presented to members of the Council, and their objections forced 
some changes to the document. As an institution to promote federal-regional 
communication and joint decision-making, it is consequently only as strong as the 
leaders’ resolve to participate in it. Nevertheless, it is an example of an institution 
which may promote intra-governmental mediation and representation. 
On the question of the independence of government, the Kozak reforms, inspired by 
a legal-formalistic view of federalism emphasize the need for and benefits of setting 
down a symmetric and rigorous division of competences. Law cannot be expected to 
solve all problems: politics too play a key role in adjudicating conflicts and struggles 
over jurisdiction. As a model of federal-regional relations, Sergei Shakhrai is critical of 
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the Kozak approach: “dividing up competences in Article 72 into ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ is 
an impossible task. By thinking that somehow, someone will solve the problems, it can 
lead to the end of the country. Indeed, independent regions (donors, for instance) will 
back away from the process” (Tsygankov 2002). The framers of the 1993 constitution 
attempted to implement a model in which cooperation and intergovernmentalism were 
to be considered means to an end: “We conceived of the Constitution as a model of 
cooperative federalism, based on the cooperation of the centre and regions” 
(Tsygankov 2002). 
In a federal polity, “[t]he existence of [a division of powers] places conflict of 
policy aims in the centre of the picture” (Wiseman 1989: 98-9). Which also signifies 
that between centre and region, many different conceptions of priorities, orientations, 
and funding requirements, may coexist or compete. The reforms seek to eliminate 
conflict by setting an unambiguous division of powers. In so doing, the Kozak reforms 
confuse means and ends. Institutional change (in this case: strict codification of 
competences and policy capacity) are presented as a ‘panacea’, whereby the problems 
of the federation can be solved by setting everything down in law (Lisitsyn 2003). 
Deputy Economic Development and Trade Minister Vitalii Shipov contends that local 
self-government reforms are aimed at stopping separatist tendencies in Tatarstan. For 
him, separatism arose in Tatarstan “as a result of the fact that there was no strict 
demarcation among federal, regional, and local powers” (RFE/RL 2003a). Here again, 
Putin’s reforms are presented as an end: separatism arises from incomplete institutional 
design. 
It is in the Law on Regional Government that one of the most significant shifts has 
occurred. Throughout the 1990s, the bilateral treaty process was one of the main 
pressure valves, a way in which federal-regional practice could remain flexible. The 
Kozak reforms, with their emphasis on a division of competences and legislative 
approval of bilateral treaties, severely restrict the ability of the regional leaders to 
revert to executive federalism as a means of responding to governance challenges. 
Bilateralism is argued to have been a necessary, but transitory, phenomenon, a ‘coping 
strategy’ the benefits of which (containing separatism, moderating ethno-nationalist 
mobilization in republics) have since ebbed (Tompson 2002: 938). In the context of the 
political struggles of 1993, Shakhrai mentions that many things were left loose in the 
constitution (namely the relations between the central and regional governments) to be 
resolved once the political climate would be more relaxed (quoted in Tsygankov 2002). 
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The “elasticity” of Yeltsin’s approach throughout the 1990s may have helped to avoid 
crises (Nicholson 2003: 17). 
The recognition of difference – by means such as bilateral treaties in the case of 
Russia – is an important factor in multinational federal systems. Nevertheless, ethnic 
difference seems to have been completely overlooked in Putin’s reforms. From the 
very beginning, asymmetrical federalism through bilateral treaties was conceived as a 
means of regulating ethno-territorial differences, and accommodating republics within 
the federal system and institutions (Erk and Gagnon 2000; Gagnon and Tully 2001; 
Hughes 2001b; Kymlicka 2001; Smith 1998). Asymmetry may not be the cause of 
separatism, however, but rather a reflection of Russia’s ethnic heterogeneity (Furman 
2000), and of the fact that different regions may seek to adopt different policies to suit 
particular social, institutional, historical, etc. conditions. Asymmetry, therefore, 
becomes an expression of diversity, the recognition of which becomes a salient 
political issue (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1992; Taylor 1995). Indeed, ‘recognition’ can 
take many forms – asymmetrical policy capacity, differentiated rights, representation 
within central institutions, etc. We must therefore wonder whether Putin’s reforms 
continue to provide the tools for such recognition. Leonid Smirnyagin concludes that 
much of what Putin says and does indicates that he does not favour Russia’s federal 
structure, or at least does not understand federalism (Smirnyagin 2001). 
Negotiated federalism provided Russia’s leaders with much-needed constitutional 
flexibility to get beyond fundamental disagreement on the nature of the federal 
covenant in Russia. At the outset, the refusal of Tatarstan and Chechnya to sign the 
federal treaty and recognize the 1993 constitution outlined a fundamental lack of 
agreement on constitutional fundamentals. In Chechnya, for a number of reasons, the 
lack of agreement was unbridgeable (Hughes 2001a). In Tatarstan, the bilateral treaties 
provided a degree of flexibility. Constitutional differences have not been completely 
resolved, as the debate continues as to whether federal relations between Moscow and 
Kazan’ are bottom-up, “treaty-constitutional”, or top-down (Khakimov 1997). 
Although the bilateral process lacked the transparency that a transition to 
constitutionalism may have required, it provided some important leeway to federal and 
regional political leaderships to reach consensus on power sharing. Executive 
federalism – agreements reached by political elites – was able to bridge differences 
which a more transparent, parliamentary process might not have been able to resolve. 
Such practices of negotiated, executive federalism as a means of regulating federal-
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regional relations imply certain trade-offs (for instance, full transparency or 
participatory governance), which must be weighed against the political exigencies of 
the need to avoid ethnopolitical conflict and maintain stability (Simeon and Conway 
2001). Moreover, executive federalism as a practice emphasizes the importance of 
politics and process in the regulation of difference. As these exigencies or leaders 
change, the relative importance of transparency, symmetry, etc. may increase relative 
to the need to regulate ethnopolitical difference. This is an aspect which has been 
neglected by most scholars and observers of contemporary Russian federalism. 
Thus far, Putin’s reforms have been analysed as the expression of a need for change 
and for additional stability and certainty in federal-regional relations. Yet, what the 
reforms overlook, besides the fact that ethnicity is a particularity which many in Russia 
argue is worthy of accommodation, is that if the legitimacy of the constitution is 
challenged, attempts to reiterate the division of powers will not bridge the initial 
legitimacy gap. Recent developments in Chechnya provide a potent example of the 
nearsightedness of this process. The experience in Chechnya is at odds with federal 
practice of the 1990s because the differences between Moscow and Grozny ultimately 
resulted in brutal conflict. As we follow the vicissitudes of federal intervention there, 
from the ‘operation to restore constitutional stability’ (1994-1996) via the 
‘antiterrorism operation’ (1999-2003) to the most recent efforts to reclassify the 
intervention as an affair to ‘protect law and constitutional order’, the Presidential 
Administration formed a working group in July 2003 to prepare yet another treaty 
demarcating the powers between the centre and Chechnya. However, the draft which 
the President of Chechnya Akhmad Kadyrov released is exactly what the federal 
government purports it no longer wants to see in its relations with federal subjects. The 
draft treaty asserts inter alia its primacy over federal legislation and Chechnya’s sole 
right to exploit its natural resources (RFE/RL 2003a). Petrov (2003) argues that this 
demonstrates the “advantages of pragmatism over an excessively rigid approach” and 
that Moscow can consequently learn from its mistakes. While it is unclear what the 
final agreement will look like, the challenge to Putin’s own idiom of federalism is 
clear. What will happen, however, if Parliament does not pass the requisite federal 
laws? What will the knock-on effects of signing such a pact be with other activist 
republics, such as Tatarstan, which must also renegotiate its agreements? The federal 
government has been adamant on removing the tools which had hitherto given the 
federation a degree of flexibility in dealing with republics such as Chechnya. Could we 
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therefore really expect an agreement with Chechnya to be sunk by the inflexibility of 
Putin’s concept of federalism? 
Chechnya is not alone in providing indications that the centre and some republics 
are speaking at cross-purposes. Tatar President Shaimiev also contends that the fate of 
each power-sharing agreement should be up to each region to decide and that for 
Tatarstan, “the agreement is the second most important document, after the 
constitution” (in RFE/RL 2001a). He complains that while regions had to change their 
laws to bring them into line with federal legislation, the centre has not brought its own 
laws into line with the federal constitution. Federal structures in the regions are gaining 
in size and usurping the independence of the regions. “From this deadlock”, Shaimiev 
stated in June 2003, “there is only one solution – give regions their independence back” 
(Postnova 2003). Chuvash President Nikolai Fedorov also argues that Putin’s reforms 
are “giving the nationalists and separatists of all stripes new trump cards to stage rallies 
because the interests of Ingushetia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and other regions are 
allegedly ignored .… This is where the main threat posed by Putin’s reforms lies, and 
the Kremlin underestimates it” (Tropkina 2000). 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
This article will not be so bold as to assert that Putin’s reforms will lead to chaos, or a 
new ‘parade of sovereignties’. It does, however, assert that we need to acknowledge the 
shift occurring in federal-regional relations in Russia and be conscious of some 
potential consequences. Codifying competences and assigning funding requirements, in 
themselves, are not risky proposals. Asymmetric federalism or bilateralism per se does 
not lead to state collapse. The way in which these were practised in Russia may well 
have been unsustainable and required changes. Although Boris Yeltsin attempted to 
manage the treaty process, he did so too late and in a way that remained under-
implemented. Moreover, throughout the 1990s and up to now, unfunded mandates and 
inequality have remained a significant problem, which directly impacts the quality of 
life of citizens. Just as institutions are not cast in stone and adapt to changing 
circumstances, Russia’s federal system may also be evolving to adapt to new 
requirements. With legislative elections in December 2003, and presidential elections 
in March 2004, the extent to which Kozak’s laws are implemented, and reforms in 
federative relations continue along similar lines remains to be seen. 
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This article argued that reform was necessary to stabilize state capacity, ensure laws, 
the constitution and court decisions were implemented and rationalize inter-budgetary 
relations. However, we should not lose sight of the political exigencies that gave rise to 
the practice of negotiated federalism, and significant autonomy to federal units, in the 
first place. Although such an outcome is far from the reformers’ intentions, Putin’s 
reforms, and the Kozak laws in particular, could reopen the can of worms that is 
asymmetrical federalism in Russia. If this article is right to analyse Putin’s reforms as 
an attempt at equalizing and homogenizing Russia’s subjects, there is a risk that the 
very pressures and centrifugal tendencies which had been successfully regulated by 
negotiated federalism and bilateralism return to the fore. The next two years will be 
extremely interesting from this point of view, as the existing treaties will need to be re-
examined, and passed by the federal legislature. The question still remains, however,  
as to what will happen if the Duma refuses to ratify Moscow’s treaty with Tatarstan or 
Chechnya. Alexseev (2001: 105) believes that regionalism and difference are 
bridgeable, that the continued resilience of the Russian Federation lies in the ability of 
its institutions to live with diversity and nurture the evolution of a “ground-up 
evolution of formal and informal institutions that mediate center-periphery grievances 
and disputes”. Perhaps the pragmatism of the 1990s will not be lost as the recent 
proposals for a treaty with Chechnya illustrate. Nevertheless, we need to heed these 
words more carefully, as a failure to continue to adopt and adapt institutions to 
recognize the salience of diversity may turn out to be a risky proposal indeed. 
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